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COMMENT
MIRROR, MIRROR ON THE WALL:
HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
Alfred S. Konefsky* and John Henry Schlegel**
Numerous histories of law schools have been published in the
last twenty-five years. In this Comment, Professors Konefsky and
Schlegel review the field and discover a disturbing similarity.
Rather than providing us with detailed knowledge of the unique
characteristics of individual institutions and their inhabitants or
the social context in which they are embedded, these histories
reduce to carbon-copy tributes to the rise of the American law
professor and the establishment of his preserve - the full-time,
three-year, graduate program of pure law. The authors suggest the
importance of, and provide some guidance for, serious scholarly
inquiry in the area.
T HERE was a time when law schools were sold like-
indeed with - patent medicines and military schools, a
time when Harvard advertised the size of its library and
bragged that "two hundred courses in Harvard College alone"
were "open to law students free of charge," when Cornell
thought itself distinctive because it had "five full professors,"
and when Virginia emphasized that its "course designed for
two years" was "sometimes completed in less. ' 1 Times have
changed. At least, none of these law schools would advertise,
and for those schools that do, their advertisements focus only
on the packaging rather than on any distinctive features of the
product. They remind one of transcontinental airlines offering
in-flight movies or of Avis trying harder. This decline of the
free market in law schools has, at least in its broad contours,
been thoroughly chronicled. 2 But the details of what happened
* Associate Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University
of New York, Buffalo.
** Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New
York, Buffalo.
The authors wish to dedicate this piece to the memory of Art Leff, who understood
about sugar and medicine. Thanks is due to Harry Arthurs, who helped us correct
our understanding of the history of Canadian legal education, to Erika Chadbourn,
who permitted us to quote from the papers of Thomas Reed Powell, and to Samuel
F. Howard, Jr., who permitted us to quote from a letter written to one of us.
2 GREEN BAG law school advertisements (189o).
2 The standard chronicle is Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law
School, 5 PERSp. A . HIST. 405 (1971). A more economic and less illuminating
account is First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (pt. i), 53 N.Y.U. L.
PEV. 311 (1978).
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as law schools became homogeneous in program and differ-
entiated largely by the social origins and employment desti-
nations of their students are practically unknown to scholars.
The recent publication of Tom Barnes' history of the Hastings
Law School, 3 coming as it does just shy of twenty-five years
after the so-called "Goebel" history of the Columbia Law
School, 4 suggests that one might attempt to build a detailed
understanding of the growth of American law schools by look-
ing at the histories of law schools published in the last twenty-
five years. And at first blush, the idea is reasonable. There
are twenty partial or complete monographic studies,5 and they
3 T. BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY (1978)
[hereinafter cited as HASTINGS].
4 COLUMBIA UNIV. FOUND. FOR RESEARCH IN LEGAL HISTORY, A HISTORY OF
THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY (I955) [hereinafter cited as COLUMBIA].
s This essay reviews the following sources:
S. Epstein, Law at Berkeley: The History of Boalt Hall (1979) (unpublished
doctoral thesis) [hereinafter cited as Berkeley].
T. SIMON, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL AFTER FIFTY YEARS (i98o) [herein-
after cited as BOSTON COLLEGE].
G. PEDERSEN, BUFFALO LAW SCHOOL (1962) [hereinafter cited as BUFFALO].
C. CRAMER, THE LAW SCHOOL AT CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY (1977),
reviewed in Johnson, Book Review, 22 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 332 (1978).
COLUMBIA, supra note 4, reviewed in Asper, Book Review, 16 MD. L. REv. 358
(I956), and in Bathurst, Book Review, 6 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 177 (1957), and in
Bishop, Book Review, 49 LAW LIBR. J. 300 (1956), and in Carr, Book Review, 73
LAW Q. REv. 268 (I957), and in Hertz, Book Review, 37 CHI. B. REC. 46o (I956),
and in Morgan, Book Review, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 957 (1956) (a brief sketch, but
occasionally penetrating in details), and in St. John-Stevas, Book Review, 20 MOD.
L. REv. 294 (1957), and in Yntema, Book Review, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. i41 (1957).
A. SUTHERLAND, THE LAW AT HARVARD (1967) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD],
reviewed in Abel, Book Review, x8 U. TORONTO L.J. 213 (1968), and in Goodhart,
Book Review, 8o HARV. L. REV. I818 (1967), and in Newmyer, Book Review, 54 J.
AM. HIST. 649, 65o (1967) (notes lack of a sense of "inner struggles, personal battles,
human tragedies, mistakes, and shortcomings'), and in Tucker, Book Review, 53
CORNELL L. REV. 352 (1968), and in Twining, Book Review, 84 LAW Q. REv. 401,
404 (1968) (notes spare discussion of educational ideas in book), and in Wiecek, Book
Review, 1969 WIs. L. REv. 1245, 1252-53 (some suggestions for further research),
and in Book Note, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 91 (1969); see also Leach, The Law at
Harvard: A Quasi-Review with Personalia, HARV. L. SCH. BULL., Mar. 1968, at 4.
HASTINGS, supra note 3, reviewed in Ely, Book Review, 66 J. Am. HIST. 178
(1979), and in Johnson, Book Review, 84 AM. HIST. REV. 866 (I979).
DEDICATION AND HISTORY, SCHOOL OF LAW, MONTANA STATE UNIVERSITY
(I96I) [hereinafter cited as MONTANA].
J. RAHL & K. SCHWERIN, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW - A
SHORT HISTORY (1960) [hereinafter cited as NORTHWESTERN].
P. MOORE, A CENTURY OF LAW AT NOTRE DAME (1969) [hereinafter cited as
NOTRE DAME].
M. Kirkwood & W. Owen, A Brief History of the Stanford Law School, 1893-
1946 (Mar. I96I) (unpublished manuscript on file in Harvard Law School Library)
[hereinafter cited as Stanford].
F. ELLSWORTH, LAW ON THE MIDWAY (1977) (University of Chicago), reviewed
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cover the terrain of legal education, lacking only an adequate
representation of part-time schools. Yet after reviewing this
scholarship, one is forced to conclude that twenty-five years
have taught us little about the American law school. Why
that is so, and what must be done if we are to learn more, are
the subjects of this essay.
I.
To complain that institutional history is just that is to
waste trees and ink. One need not love the genre to recognize
its durability or to be less than surprised when the hero of the
history of a law school turns out to be the institution itself.
There are some exceptions: the history of the early years of
the University of Oklahoma's law school, for example, is
tucked into the biography of its first and long-time dean, and
in William Johnson's history of legal education in Wisconsin
before World War 11, the University of Wisconsin's law school
in Paul, Book Review, 66 J. AM. HIST. 425 (I079), and in Smith, Book Review, 22
Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 330 (1978).
E.G. BROWN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT MICHIGAN 1859-1959 (1959), reviewed in
McXVhinney, Book Review, 38 CAN. B. REV. 282, 284-85 (196o), and in Quarles,
Book Review, 58 MICH. L. REV. 490 (i96o), and in Shuman, Book Review, 6 WAYNE
L. REV. 278 (I96O).
Stein, In Pursuit of Excellence (pts. x-3), 62 MINN. L. REV. 485, 857, ii6I (1978)
[hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA I]; id. (pts. 4-6), 63 MINN. L. REV.
299, 809, 1101 (1979) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA II]. All six
parts are reprinted in R. STEIN, IN PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE (1980).
V. FRATCHER, THE LAW BARN (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY OF MIS-
SOURI].
Coates, The Story of the Law School at the University of North Carolina, 47
N.C.L. REV. I (spec. issue 1968).
D. McKNoWN, THE DEAN (1973) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY OF OKLA-
HOMA], reviewed in White, Book Review, 12 Hous. L. REV. 293 (1974), and in
Wright, Book Review, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 766 (1974).
D. MAYS, THE PURSUIT OF EXCELLENCE: A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
RICHMOND LAW SCHOOL (1970) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND].
J. RITCHIE, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY
OF VIRGINIA].
W.R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS (1978) [hereinafter cited as UNIVERSITY OF
WISCONSIN], reviewed in Calhoun, Book Review, 84 Am. HIST. REV. 563 (1979)
(good criticism), and in Dunn, Book Review, 1o3 LIBR. J. 891 (1978), and in Hobson,
Book Review, 66 J. AM. HIST. 179 (I979).
One might also consult Bryson, The History of Legal Education in Virginia, 14
U. RICH. L. REv. 155 (1979) (materials on proprietary law schools); Dieffenbach, The
Origin and Development of the Salmon P. Chase College of Law, I N. KY. ST. L.F.
I (1973); First, Legal Education and the Law School of the Past: A Single-Firm Study,
8 U. TOL. L. REV. 135 (1976); Jones, Texas Southern University School of Law -
The Beginning, 4 TEX. S.L. REV. 197 (1976-1977); Lawrence, The University of
Oregon School of Law r884-19o3: The Thornton Years, 5" OR. L. REV. 249 (1980);
McKenzie, Farrah's Future: The First One Hundred Years of the University of Ala-
bama Law School, 1872-1972, 25 ALA. L. REV. 121 (1972); Washington, History and
Role of Black Law Schools, 18 How. L.J. 385 (1974).
1982]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
is not the hero but the goat. But exceptions aside, most of
these histories are not primarily stories of personal or even
group achievement but rather almost imperceptible variations
on a now well-known theme. Simply put, the school grows
from humble, but auspicious, beginnings to early triumphs and
then through occasional hard times, though with never more
than a momentary temptation to backslide from fixed and
noble goals, to a place - if only a small place - in the sun.
Perhaps one should expect little else from an art form by and
large designed to separate alumni from their money. Every
institution needs a noble past, if only as a base upon which to
build an assertedly better future. But it is hard to believe that
most law schools in fact had a history as archetypically heroic
(that is, unilluminating) as one would think from reading these
examples. Indeed, the sameness of the story, especially the
sense that, inevitably, each school should become a little Har-
vard (even Harvard!) is overwhelming.
This feeling of inevitability, akin to reading a whodunit
novel for the second time, is the most extraordinary aspect of
all of these books. One sees it even in Arthur Sutherland's
Harvard history, where the pre-Langdell era of Theophilus
Parsons and Emory Washburn is presented as quite obviously
not up to the Harvard ideal, even though its standard of
scholarship, if not its level of excitement, was surely as high
as in many years since. 6 Similarly, this sense of destiny subtly
dominates the Columbia history, in which it is soon apparent
that Stephen Nash and Seth Low are the forces of progress
and light, while lovable old Theodore Dwight, patiently lead-
ing his students through the corpus of the law, is only the
midwife for glories yet to come. 7 Perhaps obvious winners can
be expected to see the past that way. Harvard and Columbia,
early exponents and exporters of case law, Socrates, and the
Langdellian way, may take understandable, if smug, satisfac-
tion in their own vitality and that of the system they fostered.
But what of Hastings, a night school until after World War
HI and the once proud possessor of an attractive alternative to
the Langdellian tradition in the teaching and scholarship of
John Norton Pomeroy? From the first page of the discussion
of the career of Pomeroy's successor and devoted follower,
William R. Slack, it is clear that Pomeroy's enterprise is
doomed. 8 Similarly, Virginia, where case method instruction
was not introduced until one of its faculty took an S.J.D. at
6 See HARVARD, supra note 5, at 14o-6i.
7 See COLUMBIA, supra note 4, at I08-I7.
8 See HASTINGS, supra note 3, at ii6-i9, 124-29.
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Harvard in the i93o's, 9 seems only to be marking time for the
sixty years after the Civil War. Even more telling is Johnson's
Wisconsin. Johnson, who plainly thinks that modern - that
is to say, post-Langdell - legal education is a disaster, draws
an attractive, if overly romantic, picture of pre-modern legal
education as a union of practice - apprenticeship - and
theory - university training.' 0 Yet he can do little more than
lament the inevitable. He presents his model, the Marquette
Law School, as a small, poor victim of "heavy" politics, a
helpless sapling in the path of a bulldozer.1 " Indeed, in vir-
tually every book, once Langdellian orthodoxy - the three-
year graduate program of "pure law" taught from cases by the
Socratic method - is established, the force of the narrative is
spent and each author must grope for a new theme. Usually
he or she settles for chronicling the orderly succession of deans
and the occasional struggle to acquire new quarters.
Now only in the silliest deterministic sense was the Lang-
dellian revolution ever inevitable. In I89O over fifty univer-
sity-affiliated law schools, with over four thousand students,
supplied perhaps a quarter to a third of the new lawyers
entering practice. 12 Only three of these schools - Harvard,
Columbia, and Iowa - hospitably entertained the Langdellian
views. 13 The rest used some mixture of text, lecture, recita-
tion, case analysis, and what-have-you. In those days, at least,
it was not obvious that Langdell's law school would sweep the
country. True, the bearded genius of Austin Hall had several
things going for him. His program was one that made entry
into the profession difficult for the poor and thus had much
appeal in elite professional circles.14 And as a result of Ames'
efforts, Langdell had an impressive collection of young mis-
sionaries out peddling his system and with it their own profes-
sional identity. ' But the ultimate triumph of that system,
even in the narrow world of the university-affiliated day law
school, was not apparent until at least 19IO when the West
Publishing Company thought that the market was large
enough to support an entire series of case books.' 6 Even then,
9 UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, supra note 5, at 73-74.
'o See UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, supra note 5, at 42-55.
" Id. at 133-48, 155-64.
'2 See A. REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 442 (1921).
13 1 REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION FOR THE YEAR 1890-91, at
414-32 (1894) (detailed review of curriculum at law schools).
4 See J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
"' See J. Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Re-
alists: The Professionalization of the American Law Professor (Oct. 27, 1979) (paper
presented at the 9th Annual Meeting of the American Society for Legal History,
Williamsburg, Va.).
16 See The American Casebook Series, 2 Am. L. SCH. REV. 276 (i909).
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West hedged its bets by starting a second series of texts with
accompanying casebooks for those schools, obviously still nu-
merous, in which both text and cases had their place in the
classroom. 17 And in i9IO there was an entirely new market,
the part-time night law school, that ten years later was blessed
by the American Bar Association. 18 Apparently, these schools
were hardly touched by case method instruction, though we
know little more than that about most of them. 19
The view that the Langdellian revolution was inevitable
undercuts what should be a main focus of institutional history:
the uniqueness of the development of an institution. Thus,
the sameness of these accounts appears in fact to be altogether
ahistorical; the drama of birth and success is played almost
without regard to the life within the institutions. If these
histories are to be believed, contemporary law schools are
unique among institutions only in that they are completely
without traditions, save that of pursuing and occasionally find-
ing excellence. To the extent that students who do not become
faculty live at all, they seem to do so only on the law review
and the moot court board, though they are sometimes reincar-
nated as alumni. The faculty themselves are treated as faceless
teaching clones who produce uniformly interesting, high qual-
ity scholarship in total isolation from each other and who
collaborate only occasionally to raise academic standards or
reorganize the curriculum. The one grand exertion for which
a school will surely unite is to acquire a new building. Even
here, however, the school acts as every other school acts, and
the voices of individuals are drowned out by the chant of the
mass that it must have more room.
Yet every law school must have some traditions. They
may only be poor teaching and hard grading rather than such
quaint customs as dressing all third year students in bowlers
and canes for "Derby day" at Montana in the teens, 20 or the
weekly faculty luncheon meeting at Yale in the twenties and
thirties, or Friday afternoon "wine mess" at Chicago in the
sixties, but they are there. Eighty to ninety percent of the
students in a law school never play the law review-moot court
game, and it is this large group that sets the dominant culture
of a school. Richmond in the twenties, for example, was a
17 See, e.g., 3 Am. L. SCH. REV. back cover (Spring 1913) (advertisement).
18 Stevens, supra note 2, at 46o-6i.
19 Stevens, Law Schools and Legal Education, 1879-979: Lectures in Honor of
xoo Years of the Valparaiso Law School, 14 VAL. U.L. REv. 179 (198O), makes the
first attempt to learn something about these schools.
20 MONTANA, supra note 5, at 32-33.
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night school, and students prepared for class strap-hanging on
the trolley line from downtown to the suburban campus. 2 1 At
Oklahoma, 22 they engaged in rather elaborate high jinx "wars"
with other groups of undergraduates. And at several places
at different times, more bridge seems to have been played than
law studied. 2 3
While one can perhaps understand faculty authors slighting
what is basically student culture, one has a harder time un-
derstanding faculty distortion of faculty culture. The notion
that a move to better quarters has such an impact on a law
school that a detailed recounting of the trials and tribulations
of the acquisition is appropriate is thoroughly belied by these
volumes. In not one instance is it shown, or even implied,
that scholarship or teaching improved as a result of a move to
more spacious quarters. In fact, one occasionally notices that
the move broke a tight-knit fellowship that grew up in the
earlier, more cramped world. 24 But such acknowledgements
that there are even elements of a faculty culture are few. For
example, there are but four instances in all these stories in
which faculty can be seen actually arguing with each other, 25
though some intramural feuds between faculty are famous,
such as the one that pitted Pound against Frankfurter and
Landis. 26
The unilluminating sameness of these accounts is continued
into the one facet of law school life that one learns most
about - the almost lockstep procession of deans. It is as if
these books follow a rule drawn from boys and baseball cards
- one dean is worth six faculty. If faculty get three lines
apiece, deans get a page or two; if faculty get a paragraph or
two, deans get pages or on occasion even a chapter. Now all
this would be fine if the question of who was dean of a law
school was shown to matter somehow. But strange as it may
seem when virtually every volume marks the beginnings and
endings of eras with changes in the deanship, there is almost
no evidence that who the dean was made any difference. A
larger collection of noisy barrels it would be hard to find. Few
after Langdell seem to have had any coherent, much less
original, thoughts on legal education and those who did, for
21 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMIOND, supra note 5, at 29-30.
22 UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA, supra note 5, at 223-26.
23 See, e.g., D. RITCHIE, JAMiES M. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 17
(i98o).
24 UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note 5, at 34-43.
25 COLUMBIA, supra note 4, at 299-305; UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note 5,
at 85-90 (two instances); Berkeley, supra note 5, at 384-85.
26 D. RITCHIE, supra note 23, at 35, 37, 40-42, 50.
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example, Harlan F. Stone, 27 had little impact beyond their
office door. Yet the implied proposition that deans do not
matter is clearly counterintuitive. Many deans have at least
had the power to hire and fire juniors and to make teaching
assignments. 2 8 But though there are exceptions - Wigmore
is one, 29 and Vance in faculty recruitment at Minnesota an-
other 30 - the average dean in these histories appears to do
little more than hitch his charges to the dog sled and mush
"Excellence!"
And if these histories reveal only darkly the life within law
schools, the life outside them is not seen at all. Each school
floats through time anchored only to its beginning - the day
they opened the doors - and to an assumed present. Except
for Boston College3 ' and Buffalo, 32 each leads a kind of Stover
at Yale existence in between, a life of perpetual spring green
and ivy-covered tudor limestone, with only the mistiest of
attachments to a world outside its doors. Interruptions there
are - two world wars and, in the most recent books, Cam-
bodia - but clearly they are only interruptions, for order
returns soon after the late unpleasantness. A particularly glar-
ing example of this social isolation is in the treatment of
women. Every author of a book written since 1975 remarks
on the phenomenal influx of women into law schools in the
past decade. Occasionally an author will even somewhat self-
consciously point out the first female graduate and recount her
truncated career. But not one book seriously discusses the
exclusionary practices by law schools in the years before i968
or the chance conjunction of two events: a decline in law
school applications as Lyndon Johnson began to draft law
students and the first stirrings of a vocal, revitalized women's
movement, a coincidence that makes law schools look sub-
27 COLUMBIA, supra note 4, at 226-30.
28 See, e.g., Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase Idea and the Uniform Commercial
Code: Confession of a Repentant Draftsman, i5 GA. L. REV. 6o5, 605 (i98i) ("At the
end of World War II, I gratefully accepted an invitation to join the faculty of the
Yale Law School. When I reported for duty in New Haven, Dean Wesley Sturges
said to me, 'You will teach sales.' I said, 'Yes, sir.'")
29 NORTHWESTERN, supra note 5, at 19-21. The extent of Wigmore's influence on
that school is however better captured in W. ROALFE, JOHN HENRY WIGMORE:
SCHOLAR AND REFORMER (1977).
30 UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA I, supra note 5, at 867-72.
31 BOSTON COLLEGE, supra note 5, at 6, I5, 21 (reveling in its early downtown
Boston existence).
32 BUFFALO, supra note 5, at 31, 37, 47, 59 (knowing only a downtown existence
at the time its history was written).
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stantially more opportunistic than one might otherwise be led
to believe. And for all the furor over DeFunis,33 the problems
of blacks and of fashioning affirmative action programs get
little if any attention, though here Bob Stein is a clear and
important exception. 3 4
Other social, political, and intellectual events are similarly
conspicuous only by their absence. Labor unrest in the nineties
is touched nowhere; progressivism apparently reached only
Berkeley, 35 Wisconsin, 36 and perhaps Harvard;37 legal realism
infected only Columbia and did little more there than immu-
nize the patient;3 8 the New Deal touched Columbia, 39 Har-
vard,40 and Berkeley lightly4' by drawing teachers away from
class; and the McCarthy era reached only Berkeley 42 and, in
a veiled way, Notre Dame. 4 3 Perhaps these omissions are
merely an accurate reflection of the oft-decried insularity of
law schools. But the picture thus painted may be even more
revealing. In omitting any mention of the outer world im-
pinging on their private island, law school historians are sim-
ply replicating what goes on in most law schools - the treating
of law as an autonomous and apolitical ordering. Intellectual
movements, large-scale political events, debates on social is-
sues, theoretical musings, and ideology warrant no mention in
a law school history for they apparently have no significant
influence on the teaching of law at most schools. To the extent
that they are discussed at all in the law school classroom, they
are kept within a framework that prevents fundamental anal-
ysis and criticism. By ignoring all but the pursuit of the
narrowest conception of law, law school historians reveal their
own ideology. They do not have to scream from the rooftops,
"Social context is irrelevant." All they need do is sing Boola-
Boola and exit stage left.
33 DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (I974) (suit challenging law school's affir-
mative action program declared moot).
34 See UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA I, supra note 5, at 870-79, 1209--I3.
35 Berkeley, supra note 5, at 73-80.
36 UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, supra note 5, at 164-7o.
37 One has to look carefully to discern Pound's ties to progressive causes; Frank-
furter's are a trifle clearer. HARVARD, supa note 5, at 237-39, 241-42.
38 COLUMBIA, supra note 4, at 297-99 (seen as a movement in legal education
only).
31 Id. at 336-37.
40 HARVARD, supra note 5, at 287-88, 302-03.
41 Berkeley, supra note 5, at 226-28.
42 Id. at 303-04.




Why these histories are collectively so uninformative, why
we have learned so little in twenty-five years is a question with
many answers. One explanation is intimately related to the
genre itself and bears only brief mention. Given that these are
institutional histories whose supposed audience is alumni, it is
not surprising that the institution receives a certain amount of
protection. Muckraking and serious inquiry into reasons for
failure would not be the appropriate vehicle with which to
launch fund-raising efforts. You protect what you hope to
build. Thus, one senses in the texts the notion that this is not
really a serious form of scholarship, an impression that is
reinforced by the fact that most of the authors are aging or
retired faculty members, devoted alumni, or, curiously, soon-
to-be deans.
A second explanation is directly related to the first. That
most American legal history is tory history is now a common-
place perception, 44 and protectiveness towards institutions is
an old tory trait. Examples of the political conservatism in all
of this work are legion. For instance, at Boston College in
i970, Father Drinan resigned as dean to run for Congress,
where he could press his antiwar concerns more effectively.
Soon thereafter, the United States invaded Cambodia, students
were shot and killed at Kent State and Jackson State, and
campus after campus, including Boston College, was closed by
antiwar protests. Of these events, the school's historian re-
counts, "In retrospect, it is clear that most students joined on
for the free ride," and then observes, "Only a day or two of
classes were missed in any subjects . . . . "- Some damage
was done, but not much. "[E]xaminations, however, were
devastated":4 6 that is, "[t]he faculty reluctantly agreed to allow
second and third year students to pass courses on certification
that they had completed class work,"' 4 7 which is to say a
handful of people passed a course they would not otherwise
have passed and everyone managed to escape for one semester
from the school's grading system. But all was not lost. "First
year tests proceeded normally."' 48 The press of meritocratic
professionalism here is astonishing.
Other examples might be offered, indeed other examples
44 Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History,
17 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973), offers the first significant statement of this position.






related to the Cambodian invasion, 49 but the key point is to
underline the traits of tory legal history that all of these books
share. One is the deep concern with continuity. Another is
the obsessive interest in origins, especially when origins are
unremarkable. And for tories the unwillingness to discuss
unpleasant, even discriminatory, aspects of legal education -
like the exclusion of women and blacks, or the attempt to
exclude immigrants - is, if not forgivable, at least understand-
able. It is winners' history of the most conventional variety
written from the top down.
It would be tempting to pass off the other defects in these
works - the invisible faculty and students, the visibly unim-
portant deans, the passion for new buildings, and the sameness
of the story of rising standards - to toryism and be done with
it. Tory history, however, is usually heavy with the cultiva-
tion of and respect for tradition. Yet, as we have noted, one
of the characteristics of these works is the pronounced absence
of tradition. A more important explanatory variable than pure
toryism is the commitment to a world view that is so distinc-
tively a part of these histories of law schools that it is slighted
if lumped together with other conservative ways of thinking.
It is the world view of the university legal academic - case
method, law review scholarship, and the progress of rising
standards. It is, in a word, the world view of the academic
lawyer as a "professional."
The concern of legal academics over their professional role
dates back at least as far as Christopher Columbus (Langdell,
that is), who when announcing that the law was a "science"
opined that, if on the contrary it was but a "species of han-
dicraft," "a university will best consult its own dignity in
declining to teach it." 0 The linchpin of that identity was the
case-method/common-law/private-law system that Langdell set
into concrete at Harvard. s l This system allowed the legal
academic exclusive control over a corner of the university
community and thus the chance to profit from that control. S2
Part of that profit hinged on the ability to exclude others from
teaching law through the attempt to establish the full-time,
day, university-affiliated law school as the only route to the
practice of law. Similarly, part of the way to attain respect-
ability in the university community, as well as to stay relatively
4 9 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI, supra note 5, at 88-90.
5o Address by Dean Langdell, Harvard University 'Quarter-Millenial' Celebration
(Nov. 5, 1887), reprinted in 3 LAw Q. REV. 123, 124 (1887).
51 See HARVARD, supra note 5, at 162-205.
52 Here we adopt a parallel of the argument advanced in M. LARSON, THE RISE
OF PROFESSIONALISM at xvi-xvii (1977).
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free from university administrative control, was to establish
law, like medicine, as a wholly graduate degree program.
Thus, in the case method is found both the distinctiveness of
and protective coloration for the modern American law
teacher. It informs his identity as a teacher and scholar whose
method is unique, and at the same time allows him to be just
one of the boys at the faculty club.
The development and success of this identity was inevitable
only on the assumption that Langdell's system was somehow
intellectually necessary for the development of the legal profes-
sion. But that assumption has consequences that expose mem-
bers of the legal profession as grasping monopoly capitalists
- a view that surely few, if any, of these authors would be
eager to embrace. Three years of daytime, pure-law, graduate
education are by no means necessary to become an accom-
plished legal technician. But if it is assumed that they are
necessary to join the intellectual elite of the profession, then
those who cannot afford that education will be effectively
barred from the ranks of the elite. Jerold Auerbach5 3 and
Robert Stevens-4 have argued persuasively that one of the
reasons for the movement for higher admissions standards for
law school and for the bar between 189o and 1940 was Amer-
ican nativism, a wish to keep the poor in general and the
immigrant poor in particular out of the legal profession.55
These efforts were made simply by requiring a minimum num-
ber of class hours for accreditation. The number of costly
years of education required was thereby increased, and many
part-time schools, which were less costly because they permit-
ted students to support themselves while attending school,
were closed. The case method fits neatly into this pattern by
giving teachers something to teach and students something to
puzzle over during the three years of full-time study.
Once this complex of elements that makes up the profes-
sional identity of the law professor is isolated, much that is
puzzling about the boring sameness of these accounts becomes
explicable. Each of these law school histories is indirectly a
paean to the professional law teacher. Each chronicles his rise
and the foundation of his distinctive identity at a given school.
Thus, in each of them the major theme is the slow progression
of advancing standards, and the high point is the establishment
of case method orthodoxy. The contingency of both these
s3 J. AUERBACH, supra note 14.
54 Stevens, supra note 2.
55 The failure of any of these law school histories even to mention Auerbach's and
Stevens' scholarship is but another example of their failure to take account of any
social context. See supra pp. 840-41.
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aspects of the histories can be shown by a comparison with
the recent history of the Dalhousie Law School,5 6 long consid-
ered the Harvard of Canada for its practice of hiring teachers
with graduate degrees from the apostolic successors to the
chair of St. Christopher Langdell.
Although Canadian legal education has in large measure
paralleled the American shift from undergraduate to graduate
education5 7 and although in the twenties Dalhousie largely
pioneered the use of the case method in Canada,58 the latter
event is not a special high point in the Dalhousie study; nor
is the former shift a pervasive theme. This lack of emphasis
is not surprising, for the identity of the professional law teacher
in English-speaking Canada is not deeply bound up with case
method teaching or with rising standards. Instead, the identity
of this subspecies was critically shaped in a fight, extending
into the fifties, between university law teachers of all stripes,
most of whom could trace their pedigree back to Dalhousie,
and the "benchers" of the Law Society of Upper Canada, who
attempted to keep Ontario's Osgood Hall Law School the ex-
clusive preserve of part-time, practitioner-teachers. 5 9 The dif-
ference that this distinction makes in the form of the Dalhousie
history is striking. Instead of having to think up something
to say about the fifty or so years after standards have risen,
as does the writer of an American law school history, the
historian of Dalhousie has to fill out the sixty or so years
between its establishment as the first university school in En-
glish-speaking Canada and the ultimate triumph of that form.
In other words, whereas in the American version the climax
comes too soon, in the Canadian version it is inordinately
postponed. The narrative problem can be envisioned by sup-
56 J. WILLIS, A HISTORY OF DALHOUSIE LAW SCHOOL (1979).
s1 There is no history of Canadian legal education comparable to Stevens' history
of American legal education. We base our assertion on J. WILLIS, Supra note 57, at
39, 68, 72, 86-87, and a review of his sources. That is true for the balance of this
paragraph as well.
11 Id. at 82-84, 105-07, 135. Professor Harry Arthurs has cautioned us that claims
for the primacy of Dalhousie in this regard are in fact overdrawn by the author of
Dalhousie's history. It is more likely, he suggests, that case method instruction sprang
up all over Canada in the twenties. That this is true for at least one other law school
is evident from Bucknall, Baldwin & Larkin, Pedants, Practitioners and Prophets:
Legal Education at Osgood Hall to 1957, 6 OSGOOD HALL L.J. 137, 195 (x968), a
piece that screams out its theme - the rise of the professional law teacher.
9 J. WILLIS, supra note 56, at 7-8, 21, 116, 139, I51-52. Here again, Professor
Arthurs cautions that, while as a matter of demonology the Dalhousie history is
correct, in fact practitioners generally were the opponents of the spread of university-
based legal education in Ontario, and the leaders of that fight were faculty of Osgood
Hall. Support for the second proposition can be found in Bucknall, Baldwin &
Larkin, supra note 58, at 207-20.
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posing that Langdell had taught at Indiana University and
that Harvard, Yale, and Columbia had only been converted
after World War II. The Dalhousie historian struggles might-
fly with the problem and does manage to create two themes,
both of which tie directly into the professional identity of the
Canadian law teacher: the slow spread of Dalhousie's influence
throughout Canada and the peculiar (to Americans) combina-
tion of the teacher and public servant, which distinguishes
many of its teachers from its first dean down through those
teaching during World War II.
Thus, looked at together, both the American and the Ca-
nadian volumes are about the same subject - the rise of the
professional law teacher - but the details of that story, which
seem to the American writers so necessary and important, are
in fact somewhat accidental examples of several roads that
might have been taken in differing social circumstances. And
the emphasis placed on these accidental features only serves
to underline what the story is really about. These books are
only incidentally histories of law schools; primarily, they are
testimonials. Like those some ninety years ago to Horsford's
Acid Phosphate - "Decidedly beneficial in nervous exhaus-
tion" 60 - these advertisements attest to the value and impor-
tance of the law teacher.
Once one identifies the reason why the themes of the case
method and rising standards are central to these books, the
balance of their content falls quickly into place with a certain
dialectical flare. The law review-moot court world is taken to
be the visible student culture of the law school because it does
not undercut the notion of a scholarly vocation consistent with
being a professor in a graduate school. The faculty too is
largely invisible because the reality of indifferent, if often de-
voted, teaching and mediocre or nonexistent scholarship sim-
ilarly belies the pretensions of professional self-image. Thus,
the loss of momentum that is felt once the full-time, day
program of instruction for graduate students is established in
each of these books is the result of the author's perfectly
understandable inability to confront reality when telling a story
about the establishment of a professional identity wholly at
odds with reality. Unable to validate the profession's self-
image in either students or teachers, the law school historian
displaces his subject to one of progress, the orderly succession
of deans, the acquisition of better quarters, and the faint
possibility of excellence in the future.




Despite the flaws in all these works, first-rate, serious schol-
arship in the genre is possible. The best example is provided
by the grand old man of the bunch, the Columbia history. Its
main author was not Julius Goebel, who was too busy with
other projects and thus contributed only the last half dozen
pages of text, but Samuel F. Howard, Jr., one of Columbia's
assistants in law hanging on for a year after completing his
LL.B. 61 An amateur with no graduate historiographic train-
ing, he resisted the project director's pressure to do something
short and anecdotal, substantially completed the manuscript
in a year at Columbia, and finished his task on nights and
weekends while beginning practice. 62 The result of his pre-
viously unsung efforts is a history that is eminently readable,
sensitive to its cast of characters, often revelatory in its probing
beneath the surface of events, and both encyclopedic in scope
and teutonic in its painstaking documentation.
Similarly, Barnes' history of Hastings reads, as one would
expect, like the work of a first-rate, professional historian.
The prose moves well. Some of the characters in the play
- Serranus Clinton Hastings, the founder, 63 and Clara Short-
ridge Foltz, the first female student, 64 and to a lesser extent
John Norton Pomeroy, the first teacher 6S - have real human
dimensions. And some of the events that shaped the school
are rendered clearly and convincingly, especially Serranus
Hastings' fights with the trustees of his school 66 and Clara
61
Professor Goebel was asked to write the Law School history; he was not
interested in the matter, and suggested that the task be assigned to me. I was
interviewed by the Columbia College professor who at the time was in charge
of the overall project, and got the job. At the end of the semester, accordingly,
my associateship was terminated and I became a member of the staff of the
Foundation for Research in Legal History, to devote my full time to the
projected history for a year.
• . . Professor Goebel, who had other fish to fry, gave me a free hand to
do what I pleased. He let me work in his office at Kent Hall (to which he
came only to pick up his mail); he arranged for the Law School secretarial staff
to type my manuscript as I wrote it; and he read over the typescript and
pointed out some typographical errors I had overlooked; but that was the
extent of his supervision. He had the 'final cut,' as they say in the moving
picture business, but he did not try to exercise it, and he did not try to tell me
what to write or how.
Letter from Samuel F. Howard, Jr., to John Henry Schlegel (Mar. 23, xg8o) (in
possession of the authors).
62 Id.
63 HASTINGS, supra note 3, at 11-42.
64 Id. at 47-58.
6S Id. at 89-IIo, 115-17.
66 Id. at 61-87.
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Foltz' fights with the trustees and the bar, both in and out of
the courts. 67 Also, the painstaking reconstruction of Pomeroy's
"system" 68 is a real addition to our understanding of how law
was taught before the "Harvardization" of law schools gener-
ally. Unfortunately, with the slow demise of that system under
Pomeroy's successor, the force, interest, and clarity of the
narrative decline markedly. This extended anticlimax con-
trasts with Howard's work, which drives hard all the way to
the end, yet does an equally fine job on such characters as
Theodore Dwight, and clearly and poignantly renders the
events surrounding the demise of Dwight and his system.
Thus, the genre need not be dismissed entirely. But if we
are to improve our knowledge of what goes on in law schools,
then law school histories generally must start seeing people,
both students and teachers, in their social settings, broadly
construed to include the ideology of legal education. 69 We all
know that law professors managed to acquire both an effective
monopoly over legal education and a relatively insulated place
in the modern university.70 We also know that just about
every law school became a little Harvard, if only in its mind's
eye. But our understanding of the life inside these institutions
is still woefully incomplete. And a fuller grasp of the historical
development of law schools would help us to comprehend and
cope with the various problems in scholarship, teaching, and
community that they face today.
Ever since James Bradley Thayer formulated a justification
for the professional role of the American law teacher 71 em-
phasis has been placed on the importance of scholarship for
professional (and personal) advancement. Yet legal scholar-
67 Id. at 47-58.
68 Id. at xoi-io.
69 See, e.g., Kennedy, First Year Law Teaching as Political Action, I LAW & Soc.
PROBS. 47 (i98o); Note, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 79 YALE L.J. II53 (1970);
Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform (Book Review), go YALE
L.J. I88O (ig8i); Klare, Book Review, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 876 (r979) (reviewing C.
KNAPP, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (r979)); R. Gordon,
Lawyers and Legal Thought in the Age of Enterprise 1-12 (Oct. ig8i) (unpublished
manuscript on file in Harvard Law School Library). Intimately related to the work
cited above are William Simon's two articles: Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy:
Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 29, and Simon, Homo
Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1980).
70 The rise of the legal professoriat is, not surprisingly, contemporaneous with and
related to the broader trend of professionalization in various disciplines within the
university. See M. FURNER, ADVOCACY & OBJECTIVITY 5, 316, 321 (1975); T. HAS-
KELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE, 220-21 (1977); see also
B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 189-9 i , 282 (1976).




ship is in many ways a bad joke. The "shortness" of a typical
law professor's vitae is one aspect of the problem. Another is
the prevalence of pieces like The Rule in Dumpor's Case in
Kansas: Toothless Tiger or Trap for the Unwary Draftsman?,
and the twin evil, the ringing of the most minute changes on
major constitutional cases such that the articles ought to be
known not by author and title, but, like prints in a series, by
number - Stone v. Powell No. 617. Yet there have been
some extraordinary scholars in the profession - Wigmore, for
example - as well as lesser but still significant lights like
Walter Wheeler Cook, who remade conflict of laws in his own
image; Karl Llewellyn, who did likewise with the sale of goods;
and Lon Fuller, who substantially redirected thought in con-
tract law. But the list is distressingly short. One possible
explanation for the lack of original thinkers is that the reward
structure within the law school is incompatible with serious
scholarship. Teachers are chosen on the assurance that they
will bear their share of the enormous class loads and partici-
pate in professional (read "safe") law reforms, bringing con-
servative bar support to the institution. Within such a reward
structure, which often perpetuates itself through inbreeding in
hiring, most scholarship is episodic, related to shifting teaching
obligations or the vagaries of the bar's reform agenda rather
than to any long-term academic commitment to advancing
knowledge.
To say that scholarship is neglected for teaching, however,
is not to say that law school teaching is adequate. The So-
cratic, teach-by-terror method and the constant diet of cases,
whatever justification one might concoct for their use in first-
year submersion, seem to impede rather than facilitate learning
in the second and third years.7 2 Yet professors continue to
play the riddler, eking out as much as possible the limited
information they have to impart.
Finally, inquiry into the problem of community within the
law school might be very revealing. At times the level of
fellowship among law professors seems to have been an im-
portant part of their lives. 73 Now at almost every gathering
of law professors, one finds in corners, and occasionally on the
podium, grey countenances lamenting lost collegiality.7 4 This
72 See HARVARD, supra note 5, at 283-84; Dunne, The Third Year Blahs: Professor
Frankfurter After Fifty Years, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1237 (198).
73 See, e.g., Stanford, supra note 5, at 4-16.
74 At some schools the decline in community seems to have set in earlier:
The situation, except in the matter of appointments, seems to me to be that
we are in no real sense a faculty, as I have understood a faculty in the other
institutions with which I have been connected. We are strikingly without co-
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decline has been noted by the Berkeley historian, who first
explained it as simply the result of the drain on faculty time
due to university and law school administrative and law re-
form activities. 75 But then she emphasized a more basic prob-
lem. Professors "are both tired and discouraged," feeling "a
strong sense of demoralization." While there are mundane
explanations for these symptoms - for example, budget cuts
and inadequate salaries - several more significant ones can
be found: "the unsatisfying relationships . . . between faculty
and students," "the shift in age distribution of the faculty," the
absence of "any distinctive dimensions to the school's academic
program," and "a lack of consensus among faculty as to pur-
pose. "76 These failures of collegiality and morale may merely
be symptomatic of the failure of law schools generally.
IV.
Guesses about what future research might show are nearly
all one comes away with after reading a pile of law school
operative intellectual interchange with regard to many matters affecting the
longtime welfare of the school. I have known to the full the joy of sympathetic
co-operation with fellow-faculty members to advance the interests of a depart-
ment and of a School with which I was long associated. It was a personal
satisfaction to participate in such co-operative planning and the results for the
School and for each of us individually were results that we all saw to be good.
I find the environment at the Harvard Law School strikingly different. As one
of my colleagues here has put it, men here are hired to teach their courses and
that is all that seems to be desired of them.
So it seems to me that we are no longer a school but a collection of separate
individuals. How much this is due to the Dean, would be difficult to say. All
we can be sure of is that a different Dean might make the situation considerably
different. Young men come to the school to teach and know nothing of the
institutional fellowship which made my life at Columbia so rich to me. For
my own part I have accepted the situation as it is and have sought to make
my personal adjustment to it by accepting my position as an individual hired
to teach a course and not desired for any other reason. To younger men this
makes for a sterility that menaces the opportunity of individual growth. It
deprives them and some of the rest of us of institutional satisfactions that are
inspiring. By contrast with what they know of other law schools, it makes
their work here a dreary grind rather than a delightful adventure.
T. Powell, The Harvard Law School (c. 1930) (unpublished manuscript in the Thomas
Reed Powell Papers, Harvard Law School Library).
It is interesting to note the close parallel between Powell's lament and the obser-
vations of the Berkeley historian half a century later:
Whereas for most of its history, the faculty at Boalt Hall had been a small,
tightly knit cohort of individuals who liked each other "indecently well," the
camaraderie of earlier days has diminished, and relationships now tend to be
a less meaningful and important part of daily life. The "spider web" phenom-
enon in which a network of relationships are bound together and in which
activities in one area reverberate throughout the whole, no longer describes the
climate; nor is the School seen as the friendly, relaxed, family-like place of
earlier days.
Berkeley, supra note 5, at 452-53.
7 5 Id. at 452-55.
76 Id. at 456-62.
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histories - at least if one has any interest in the social di-
mensions of institutions. But one can hope for more. Lawyers
make up a large part of America's elite, and we should know
something about the training and shaping of that elite. Writ-
ing a law school history should be a subtle and demanding
task. It calls for an analysis of at least three sets of variables:
(i) the particular details of the social life, narrowly construed,
of a law school; (2) the more general trends and movements
in society at large over historical periods; and (3) the interac-
tion of (i) and (2) with that most elusive of historical categories
- ideology. These three inquiries need not be mutually ex-
clusive, nor need pursuit of one methodologically undermine
mastery of the others. There is no necessary tension between
social context and ideology, parts and wholes, the particular
and the general, though in most legal history those complex
relationships are not even acknowledged. These law school
histories do of course reflect an ideology without formally re-
cognizing it. They are written as if what occurs in law school
is both uninfluenced by and has no influence or impact on the
outside world. But unconscious examples of the ideology of
meritocratic, apolitical professional service do not tell us
enough about a group that serves so many functions in Amer-
ican life. And we doubt that law professors would assert that
the institutions they live in make no difference in the lives of
their students or their society. For to paraphrase an old pro-
fessor's line, an institution that makes no difference is no
institution at all.
1982)
